Editorial Saturday 6 December 1997
The figures are striking. From relatively modest beginnings, the estimated costs of the 14 schemes rose on average by 72% as investors proposed bigger schemes involving larger loans and more equity. In Swindon the cost rose by 229%. Hospital closures and bed reductions of 7% to 44% helped meet the cost by releasing land for sale and allowing economies to be made in the new buildings.
But asset sales and conjectured "efficiency savings" have proved inadequate to bridge the affordability problem which cost escalation had created, and a series of new subsidies have been introduced. Some health authorities increased their annual commitment, taking money from other schemes and from sectors, such as community services, most likely to bear the burden of cost shunting out of the hospital system. Regional offices translated block grant capital into revenue payments, which meant subsidising privately financed projects out of the equipment and maintenance budgets of hospitals wthout privately financed schemes. In several cases equipment replacement was dropped from the deals even though equipment formed part of the estimated capital cost. And finally, the NHS Executive introduced a direct annual subsidy for the first 30 years of the private finance contract, a subsidy almost large enough in the case of Swindon to have paid for the original public scheme which the private finance initiative scheme had replaced (£42m compared with £48m).
The private finance initiative, says the report, has been bailed out and the cost borne by other parts of the health service. It has become not just a mechanism for reducing hospital services but also a costly burden. This state of affairs is unlikely to be exposed by the system of appraising the initiative, as that overlooks the costs which the scheme shifts out of the hospital sector on to others.
These are important findings. They suggest that the private finance initiative results in commercial returns unduly influencing the conduct of capital planning and the determination of asset size. In Edinburgh, for example, efficiency savings tied to the proposed new hospital imply patient throughput approaching 88 finished consultant episodes per bed per year compared with a national average for England that has levelled out at 54.(2) There is no precedent in Britain for such levels of activity. The planning base, staffing, and resource implications of the new model of care on which the hospital depends are unclear and the practical arrangements remain unpiloted. This is not healthcare planning as it is traditionally understood.
The Department of Health knows this, of course, so why is it prepared to accept the cost and the risk? The signs are that the private finance initiative offers a vehicle for another agenda that is gaining ground among NHS managers. Under this agenda, largescale capital investment provides an opportunity to redesign the hospital sector. What are the problems to which large (and costly) capital investment is supposed to be a solution? In Birmingham, where the health authority started consulting last month on its own private finance initiative plan, the problems are said to be constantly increasing referrals to relatively expensive hospitals.(3) Their solution involves reducing the size of the hospital sector by half and substituting cheaper alternatives. This means building a new health infrastructure - which is where the private finance initiative comes in.
What Birmingham's analysis omits to mention is the role of capital charges in the pressure felt by hospital budgets. Capital charges, which force hospitals to earn commercial returns, were introduced by the previous government to make transfer to private health provision that much easier. This rump of a privatisation policy continues to influence the NHS asset base by encouraging ward and hospital closure in much the same way as the old window tax encouraged bricking up windows (D Mayston, paper in preparation). To pay for the privately financed project in Birmingham, the expected rate of return on redeveloped hospitals has been increased from the current 6% to 13%.(3) So hospital costs are artificially inflated rather than hospitals simply being too expensive.
The problem for Birmingham and Edinburgh, and the other areas which are using capital spending to drive out labour from the hospital sector, is that no one is yet clear what sort of health service will result or whether it will save money. In the past the impact of capital charges was felt by chronically sick and elderly patients. The impact of the private finance initiative will be wider as early discharge and prevented admission have their effects across the board. How will these patients react when they are directed to cheaper alternatives and what sort of care can they expect to find there?
Social Welfare Research Unit,
University of Northumbria,
Newcastle upon Tyne NE7 7XA
1 Gaffney D, Pollock A M. Can the NHS afford
PFI? London: BMA, 1997.
2 Dunnigan M G. Lothian Health Board's Integrated
Healthcare Plan 1996-2003: A high risk strategy. Glasgow:
University of Glasgow, 1997.
3 Birmingham Health Authority. Birmingham's health care
future? The consultation document. Supplement:
new models for health care. Birmingham: Birmingham
Health Authority, 1997.
1 Gaffney D, Pollock A M. Can the NHS afford PFI? London: BMA, 1997.
2 Dunnigan M G. Lothian Health Board's Integrated Healthcare Plan 1996-2003: A high risk strategy. Glasgow: University of Glasgow, 1997.
3 Birmingham Health Authority. Birmingham's health care future? The consultation document. Supplement: new models for health care. Birmingham: Birmingham Health Authority, 1997.
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